AI Voice Phishing (Vishing) in 2026: Verify Callers Fast

AI voice phishing is the kind of problem I see three times a week now, and it’s getting nastier in 2026. The scammer doesn’t sound like a “scammer” anymore. They sound like your CEO. Or your IT guy. Or that vendor you pay every month without remembering why. That’s the point. AI voice phishing (also called vishing) is social engineering with better acting and worse consequences.

Back in my day, scammers had to work for it. They had to at least try to imitate a voice over a scratchy landline. Now they can spin up a convincing voice clone and call your front desk like they own the place. And if your staff’s “verification process” is “well, they sounded confident,” you’re going to have a bad week.

Let’s talk about what not to do, what to do instead, and how Palm Beach County organizations can put a caller verification process in place that’s boring, fast, and actually works.

AI voice phishing and deepfake scam calls: what’s happening in 2026

Here’s what actually happens when you ignore this: someone calls your office, claims to be an executive, IT support, or a vendor, and pushes the right buttons: urgency, authority, and confusion. Deepfake scam calls are especially effective when the attacker already knows names, job titles, and who reports to who (thanks, social media and “About Us” pages).

Common vishing scripts I keep hearing

• “I’m the CEO, traveling, and I need you to change payment details right now.” Translation: they want your money wired to their account.
• “This is IT. Read me the MFA code so I can stop the breach.” Translation: they are the breach.
• “Vendor payment portal changed. Confirm your login.” Translation: they want credentials and a foothold.
• “We need remote access to fix your workstation.” Translation: they want you to hand them the keys and hold the door.

Why AI voice phishing works (even on smart people)

Because humans are wired to cooperate on the phone. Phone calls feel “real.” A voice feels personal. And if it sounds like your boss, your brain tries to be helpful before it tries to be skeptical. That’s not a character flaw. That’s being human. Your job is to add a process that protects humans from being human.

If you want some general scam protection guidance that doesn’t involve magical thinking, Microsoft has a decent overview here: Microsoft Support guidance on protecting your PC from scams.

Suggested supporting image placement: Place the “help-desk-social-engineering-red-flags-checklist.jpg” image after this section to reinforce the red flags.

Vishing prevention that actually works: stop trusting the caller ID

Let’s get this out of the way: caller ID is not identity. Caller ID is a suggestion. A sticky note. A fortune cookie. Attackers spoof numbers all day long. If your staff says, “But the number looked right,” that’s like saying your VCR blinked 12:00 so the movie must be legit.

What NOT to do on a suspicious call

• Don’t read back MFA codes. Not “just this once.” Not “to confirm.” Never.
• Don’t install remote tools because someone asked nicely (or aggressively).
• Don’t change bank details, ACH info, or payment destination based on a phone call.
• Don’t “verify” someone by asking for easily found info (job title, last invoice amount, office address).

The boring-but-works rule

Any request involving money, credentials, MFA, or remote access must be verified out-of-band. Out-of-band means you do not use the same channel the attacker is currently controlling. If they called you, you don’t “verify” by continuing the call. You verify by ending it and using a trusted method.

Caller verification process: a fast script your staff can follow

You don’t need a 40-page policy manual that nobody reads (and then prints, spills coffee on, and files under “misc”). You need a simple caller verification process that staff can run in under two minutes.

Step 1: Stop the conversation politely

Train staff to say:

• “I can help, but I need to verify you first. I’m going to call you back using our official number.”

If the caller gets mad, pushes urgency, or tries to keep them on the line, that’s not a reason to comply. That’s a red flag doing jumping jacks.

Step 2: Use a trusted number source (not the caller)

Look up the number in:

• Your internal directory (preferred)
• A vendor contract record
• A known-good ticketing system contact

Not Google results. Not the number they provide. Not the number in an email that arrived five minutes ago.

Step 3: Call back using a secure call-back procedure

Call the trusted number. If it’s a vendor, call the main line and ask for the person by name. If it’s an executive, call their known extension or assistant. If it’s “IT,” call the help desk number you already have posted.

Step 4: Verify identity with two checks

Pick two items that are hard for outsiders to guess and easy for insiders to answer. Examples:

• A ticket number created by your staff (not the caller)
• A shared passphrase for vendor support (rotate it)
• A call-back to a second contact on file (two-person verification)

Do not use “What’s your employee ID?” if employee IDs are on badges, email signatures, or LinkedIn. Use something that requires being inside your process.

Suggested supporting image placement: Place “secure-callback-procedure-flowchart-vishing.jpg” after this section. People remember pictures better than policies.

Help desk social engineering: tighten identity checks without slowing work to a crawl

Help desks are a favorite target because help desks are trained to be helpful. Attackers know this. They also know that in many organizations, the help desk can reset passwords, enroll devices, and approve remote access. That’s not “support.” That’s the master key ring.

Rules for help desk requests (write these down)

• No MFA code collection. Ever. If your workflow includes “tell me the code,” your workflow is broken.
• No credential resets from inbound calls unless identity is verified via your approved method.
• No remote access approval without a ticket, a reason, and a verified identity.
• No payment or banking changes handled by help desk at all. Route to finance with verification.

Use role-based guardrails

Not everyone needs the ability to do everything. That’s how you end up with one panicked phone call turning into a full-blown account takeover. Limit what front-line staff can do without escalation. Yes, it’s annoying. So is cleaning up after ransomware.

If you need hands-on help tightening workstation and account security after an incident (or before one), that’s when you call in pros. We do practical fixes through business computer repair and troubleshooting and can also assist with remote support for urgent issues when you need eyes on a situation quickly.

Business phone scam protection: red flags your team must recognize

Some folks think training is a one-time slideshow. That’s adorable. Training is repetition, like learning to drive a stick shift or setting the clock on a microwave after the power flickers.

High-confidence red flags

• Urgency plus secrecy: “Don’t tell anyone, just do it.”
• Process avoidance: “I can’t do the call-back, I’m in a meeting.”
• MFA obsession: Any request for a code, push notification approval, or “temporary bypass.”
• Remote access pressure: “Install this tool right now so I can fix it.”
• Payment detail changes: New bank, new routing, new payee, new email, same old scam.
• Emotional manipulation: Anger, guilt, flattery, threats.

What to tell employees (simple and repeatable)

Try this line:

“If it’s important, it can survive a call-back.”

That one sentence prevents a lot of expensive mistakes.

Out-of-band verification: the unsexy hero of vishing prevention

Out-of-band verification is what we used to call “not being fooled by the same person twice.” You verify using a separate, trusted channel.

Good out-of-band options

• Call back using a number from your internal directory or contract record
• Use your ticketing portal to confirm the request exists
• Confirm with a second known contact (two-person rule)
• Use a pre-established vendor passphrase (rotate it like you rotate oil in a car)

Bad out-of-band options

• Calling the number they texted you
• Replying to an email thread you didn’t start
• Trusting caller ID because it “matched”

Incident response playbook: what to do when a suspicious call happens

Most places don’t fail because they got one bad call. They fail because nobody knows what to do next, so they do nothing. Then they do the wrong thing. Then they panic-buy a bunch of overpriced “solutions” they don’t configure. I’ve seen this exact problem three times a week.

Your simple response workflow

1. End the call. Don’t argue. Don’t “play along.” Hang up.
2. Document the details. Time, claimed identity, request made, callback number provided, any names used.
3. Notify the right people. Manager, IT, security point-of-contact. Fast.
4. Check for exposure. Did anyone share an MFA code? Approve a push? Install remote access? Change payment details?
5. Contain if needed. If remote access was granted, disconnect the machine from the network and get it assessed.
6. Reset and review. Password resets, revoke sessions where applicable, review logs, and tighten the process that got exploited.

If someone gave up an MFA code or allowed remote access

Look, I’m not going to sugarcoat this: treat it like an incident. The “maybe it’s fine” approach is how small problems become big invoices.

At minimum:

• Change passwords for affected accounts (from a clean device)
• Review sign-ins and active sessions where your platform allows it
• Scan the endpoint for malware and remote tools that shouldn’t be there

If you suspect malware, don’t poke it with a stick and hope. Get it handled properly via professional virus and malware removal. And if the worst happens and data gets damaged or encrypted, data recovery services are the next call. If you don’t have a backup, you don’t have data. You’re just borrowing it.

Employee security training: keep it short, practical, and frequent

Training should be like brushing your teeth. Small habit, repeated often, prevents expensive pain later.

What to include in training (15 minutes, tops)

• One-page call-back rule
• Examples of vishing scripts used against your industry
• Role-play: one suspicious call scenario per quarter
• Clear escalation path: who to notify and how

Make it easy to do the right thing

Post the official help desk number, finance verification steps, and vendor contact list where staff can find them fast. If people have to dig through three systems and a dusty binder, they’ll take the shortcut. Humans always do.

For more ongoing security awareness and scam trend coverage, Malwarebytes keeps a solid library here: Malwarebytes scam and threat resources.

Palm Beach County reality check: local businesses are targets, too

If you’re in Palm Beach County and you think “we’re too small to target,” I’ve got a bridge to sell you (and the caller will take payment in gift cards). Attackers like small and mid-sized organizations because processes are informal and people wear ten hats. That’s not a criticism. That’s Tuesday.

We regularly help organizations across West Palm Beach, Palm Beach Gardens, Lake Worth Beach, Boynton Beach, Jupiter, Wellington, and Royal Palm Beach put basic guardrails in place. Not fancy. Not overpriced. Just solid.

My bottom-line advice (write this on a sticky note)

• Assume inbound calls can be fake. Even if the voice sounds right.
• Use a secure call-back procedure using trusted numbers only.
• No MFA codes shared. No exceptions.
• Put a simple incident response playbook where staff can actually find it.
• Train little and often. Not once a year when everyone’s half-asleep.